

CHAPTER II

UNDERSTANDING THE RISE OF POPULISM THROUGH THE CRISIS OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY, NEOLIBERALISM AND GLOBALIZATION

Aykut Aykotalp

(Asst. Prof. Dr.), Kafkas University, Kars, Turkey, e-mail: ayk_alp@hotmail.com

 ORCID 0000-0001-5991-0306

1. Introduction

The concept of populism is historically traced back to the Narodnik movement in the Tsarist Russia and the People's Party in the USA. Populist movements in the 19th century emerged as a result of peasant revolts against rapid modernization and changes in the social structure (Müller, 2019: 34). Unlike the 19th century versions, populism became a concept used to describe the political leaders and movements that came to power especially in Latin America in the 20th century. In the 21st century, populism has ceased to be a style of politics peculiar to a specific region and turned into a “global phenomenon” (Moffitt, 2020: 18). In recent years, especially with the rise of the far-right in the form of a single leader, party or movement in different countries or with the increasing popular support it has gained, populism has risen globally and occupied the center of political debate again. Many theorists who study populism discuss this rise of populism in the context of the concepts of “populist Zeitgeist”, “populism age”, “populist wave”, “populist resurgence” and “populist moment”. Of course, behind the global rise of populism is the fact that the styles of populist figures, who are influential in different geographies of the globe from Europe to Asia, from Africa to Latin America, in shaping contemporary politics display a variety of common points. Although populists have a different course in terms of their strategies, ideologies, discourse and political logic, they have some common historical conditions that cause their rise. The most important historical condition for the transformation of populism into a global phenomenon is that populism and crises coincide with the same historical period, or in other words, crises have an effect that facilitates populists' coming to power. Approaches that associate populism with crises point to the crisis of political representation, rapid social transformations, and the opportunities created by crises, and emphasize the ground that crises lay for populist rise. Although crises correspond to an external phenomenon

that causes populism to become a common phenomenon or to accelerate, it would be a more correct approach to see crises as an internal feature of populism rather than as an external phenomenon (Moffitt, 2020: 176-177). In other words, it can be said that populism can be seen as a result of certain types of crises, as well as a phenomenon that causes the crisis itself to deepen and be reproduced. There are three crises with economic, political and cultural dimensions underlying the global rise of populism in recent years. The first is the crisis of liberal democracy, the second is the crisis of neoliberalism, and the third is the crisis of increasing globalization. Two important phenomena cause liberal democracies to go into a crisis. The first is that the balance of security and freedom in liberal democracies is broken on behalf of security policies, the rule of law and human rights are suspended, and the state of emergency regimes undermine democracy by transforming into a rule rather than an exception. The other is that liberal institutions and values are brought up for discussion by populist leaders, parties or movements. These two tendencies have deepened the crisis of liberal democracy. It is possible to see the rise of populism as a phenomenon that causes the crisis of liberal democracy to deepen, but it is also possible to see it as the revival of a non-liberal democracy based on the principle of popular sovereignty and political structures and institutions that have lost their legitimacy. For this reason, populism has been on the rise as a style of politics that lives on the crisis of liberal democratic values that have already entered into crisis and at the same time causes the growth of this crisis. The second important point in the rise of populism is the destruction caused by neoliberal economic policies in the public sphere. Neoliberal effects such as income distribution injustice at a global scale, insecurity, privatization of public resources, and disintegration of social networks have brought about the crisis of governance of society. Behind the reason why populist politics coming to power, there are policies that will make the social destruction created by neoliberalism manageable. At the basis of the emphasis and social support of populist politics aimed at the local and the people, there is a kind of liberation story embodied in the leader's political personality. Another factor in the rise of populist politics is the crisis of increasing globalization. As the basic discourses of populist politics include such discourses as increasing globalization destroying the differences between the local and the universal, global migration movements bringing along multinational states, the presence of immigrants weakening the national identity, the tensions created by the multi-ethnic working life, the sense of loneliness caused by individualization, and the nationalist reactions to the erosion of national identities, they are directly related to the phenomenon of globalization. This study argues that the main driving factors behind the rise of populist politics on a global scale, albeit with different motives and different

names, are the crisis of liberal democracy, the crisis of neoliberal policies and the crisis of globalization, and that populism is not an accidental response to the “crisis in the governance apparatus” resulting from these crises above, but that it is a style of politics that causes these crises to deepen.

2. Populism as the Crisis of Liberal Democracy

The relationship between liberalism and democracy harbours various tensions from the very beginning. Liberalism claims that society consists of atomized and rational individuals, that any authority over the individual must be rejected, that the free market economy is based on a spontaneous order, and therefore the state that has the monopoly of power over the individual must be limited. Therefore, for a long time, the liberal tradition has acted with an approach aimed at protecting the public (individual) against the external interventions of the rulers that disrupt the property of the individual and the functioning of the free market rather than establishing a government based on popular sovereignty (Berkday, 2008: 67). Democracy, on the other hand, is the rule of demos by its classical definition. Only a people can rule. So, how will atomized and self-interested individuals become a people? It is precisely this inner tension that underlies the tension between liberalism and democracy. Liberals claim that the sovereignty of the people should be limited, as they give priority to individual autonomy, based on the principle of human rights and the rule of law. This is because, for the liberal theory, the rule of the people has the potential to eventually transform into the tyranny of the majority. Early liberals defined democracy and suffrage in terms of limited property owners, white and male subjects, and argued that the people as a whole would not be part of the democracy. Utilitarian thinkers that emerged in the 19th century liberal tradition, on the other hand, took the universal suffrage as the principle that would allow everyone to determine what is “best” for him/her. Democracy was formulated as “providing the greatest amount of good for the greatest number of people” (Berkday, 2008: 69). Of course, throughout the 19th century, democracy and parliamentarism were constructed as synonymous to one another. In this respect, democracy assumed a representational character, in which decision makers do not directly decide. The parliament was seen as an area where the nation's sovereignty (popular sovereignty) was concretized. Elections, on the other hand, were seen as a form of competition for the seat in the parliament. While liberal representative democracy was seen as the true realization of popular sovereignty and the rule of the demos in different country experiences, in the case of many countries' experiences it led to a political composition in which a limited political elite seized power. This formal aspect of democracy has taken the form of a dominant paradigm since the second

half of the 20th century, and the parliament, elections, political institutions, rule of law, freedom of organization and thought, and multi-party life that allows different political views to compete, have been seen as indicators of democracy (Köker, 2008: 11). In this respect, liberal democracy has put forward a formula that will keep individuals with different interests together in a competitive political order under a pluralistic parliamentary structure. The parliament has been seen as the domain of pluralism. In this respect, democracy has been designed as a political regime that recognizes pluralism and preserves differences among individuals, rather than being a mechanism to unite different social subjects under a homogeneous form like the people. Carl Schmitt, in his work titled *The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy*, claims that this parliamentary order, which is based on pluralism, undermines the people and breaks the social unity, and argues that democracy cannot necessarily be based on a parliamentary structure based on pluralism (Schmitt, 1988: 32). This stressed area that Schmitt put forward between the parliament and democracy has gained a new dimension with the emergence of institutional structures that would limit the parliament in liberal democratic countries after the Second World War. Liberal democracies have aimed to reconcile the two strained areas by putting forward a formula that would consider democratic principles such as popular sovereignty, majority rule on the one hand, and constitutional principles such as individual rights and restriction of the state on the other. While liberal democracy acknowledges popular sovereignty based on the rule of the majority, it emphasizes the need for a series of institutional mechanisms that would enable pluralism, and protect freedom of expression and the rights of minorities. For this reason, in liberal democracies, the need for the existence of the constitutional court or supreme courts that will legally control the parliament and institutions and will protect fundamental rights against the "tyranny of the majority" has been seen by populists as the control of popular sovereignty by the appointed ones (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2019: 101). Therefore, the attempt to reconcile liberal values with democratic values points to a crisis of liberal democracies from the very beginning.

Populist politics on the rise have mainly been fed by this internal tension of liberal democracy. For this reason, many theorists regard populism as a kind of deviation from liberalism's constitutional understanding of the state and representative democracy, or as a phenomenon that threatens democracy as a pathological case or return of the repressed (Taggart, 2002; Arditì, 2007: 74). Of course, such an attitude based on the assumption that there is a smoothly functioning liberal democracy does not see the crisis that liberal democracy has entered into with its different dimensions for a long time. The economic and political changes in the 21st century, the state of emergency practices

introduced due to war and terrorism, security-oriented political and legal regulations, new authoritarian practices emerging on social identities and differences have interrupted the functioning of liberal democratic institutions and caused liberal democracies to enter a crisis. With the rise of new social movements emerging on a global scale, mass and social criticism of representative politics, traditional political parties and non-democratic practices have also deepened the crisis of governance of liberal democracies. The crisis experienced by liberal democracies has gained a new dimension with the emergence of populist parties, movements and leaders on a global scale. Populism, in the context of the thesis that the unfulfilled promises of liberal democracy are possible with the real representation of the people, is not an enemy of democracy, but an attempt to revive the principle of popular sovereignty that liberal values have difficulty in achieving. In this respect, populists imagine a democracy in which separation of powers, party pluralism and minority rights are not recognized by using the institutions and concepts of liberal democracy and changing their internal structures (Urbinati, 2013: 137). In other words, they emerge as a critique of the idea that democracy will rely only on liberal values and institutions. At the basis of the conflict between populism and liberal democracy is the criticism of institutional structures aimed at controlling popular sovereignty against the elected, as well as a kind of criticism of the elitist understanding that leads to the exclusion of a certain segment of society. By formulating precisely the crisis of liberal democracies in the form of the failures of their ideals, populism sees the solution to the failure in the construction of an illiberal popular sovereignty.

What should be the starting point of a democracy in the form of popular sovereignty or general will? Populism has become a part of different political projects as “a thin-centered ideology in which society is divided into a dichotomy as pure people and elites” (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2019: 31). By dividing society into two main camps, populism feeds on a dual structure, one side being a pure and integrated people and the other being the elite who are seen as the enemy of the people. Since populists promise the true representation of the people, they aspire to see or build the people as a homogeneous group without differences. For this reason, a cleavage occurs between the pluralism of liberal democracy and the integrated pure public understanding of populism (Rummens, 2017: 644). Populists claim that it is possible to draw the boundaries of the people, that the people can demonstrate a common and consistent will, and that they can rule through representatives who can directly represent themselves (Müller, 2019: 96). Populists are therefore socially considered as a kind of criticism of liberal democratic regimes' belief in the existence of institutions that restrict or limit democracy. This is because any institutional mechanism that would

impede popular sovereignty and limit the will of the people is what populism opposes. Since liberal democracies' understanding of difference and pluralism undermines the principle of popular sovereignty and majority rule, and it is seen as a fundamental obstacle to a true democracy, populism should be seen not only as the division of society into two main camps as pure people and corrupt elites, but also as an anti-pluralism (Müller, 2019: 15). The criticism of populist leaders and movements - especially right-wing leaders and movements - about the functioning of liberal democracy has led them to exhibit more authoritarian practices or to spread the opinion that they are so through the liberal understanding of democracy. This is because populists focus on the practices that enable excluded groups to participate in political and social life rather than the institutional or normative dimensions of democracy (Moffitt, 2020: 208). It is possible to say that such an attitude is also effective on the tendency of populists to use the powers or opportunities accumulated in the hands of a small minority elite as a requirement of the principle of popular sovereignty on behalf of themselves, which they see as the real representatives of the people, and their attitude towards the judiciary and the media (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2019: 102). In this respect, populism is a form of politics that deepens the crisis of liberal democracy and aspires to take it on an irreversible course, as well as a response to the crisis of governance of liberal democracy. In this respect, although populism aims to undermine the pluralism of liberal democracy, according to populists, democracy is seen as a defensible form of government to the extent that it makes it possible to protect the rights of the majority. What populists understand from democracy is to give the power of the elites to the people, to increase the capacity of the people to make decisions about the issues that affect them, and by this way to ensure the people's power. As can be seen in the examples of different countries, populists claim that they will provide the real representation of the people and they will bring the people back to power. Populism contends the pluralism of liberal democracy and the thesis that the rule of the people should be limited, but it claims that the people can rule only through representation. In this respect, populism gains meaning within the boundaries of representative democracy (Müller, 2019: 97). So much so that the people are often seen as a figure represented in the personality of the leader. In this regard, populism, rather than a critique of representation, claims that an absolute representation is not possible within the boundaries of liberal democratic values, and that only a party, leader or movement that truly represents the general will of the people will make true democracy possible. In this respect, populism should be seen as the pharmakon of democracy as a form of politics based on the re-glorification of the people with a formulation that will reestablish the principle of popular sovereignty wounded by liberal democracy. With

this aspect, while populism, as a way of overcoming the ruling crisis that liberal democracies have entered into, is a rising politics style, it has a dynamic that deepens the very crisis it is trying to solve. Populism, as it claims to be the most effective response to the crisis of liberal democracies, turns into a necessity that enables the continuity of the political order rather than a coincidence. In this respect, although populism aims to be a response to the solution of the internal crises of the political order, instead of solving the crisis of liberal democracies within the boundaries of liberal values, it turns into a form of politics that deepens the crisis of these values.

3. Populism as the Crisis of Neoliberalism

Neoliberalism is one of the most effective responses to the ruling crisis of liberalism. Although neoliberal economic policies, which started to rise on a global scale after 1980, exhibit different practices from country to country, with a series of practices such as the privatization of public assets, the withdrawal of the state from social security and development, the rise of financial institutions, the privatization of central banks, mergers, and opening up the areas of health, education, etc. market interventions, they have gained a dominant position not only as an economic policy, but also as a holistic style of politics that shapes social and daily life (Duménil & Lévy, 2009: 43). When the crisis of the welfare state experienced in the 1970s was combined with the tendency of profit rates toward falling and the political and social crisis experienced by global Keynesianism, neoliberal policies began to dominate. Neoliberalism in this respect has taken the form of class restoration that envisions a new distribution of resources and allows the economic wealth of a small minority. Neoliberalism, contrary to the classical liberals' night watchman understanding, is a style of politics that requires the state to be organized in such a way that does not interfere with the spontaneous functioning of the market, but at the same time requires the state to take an active role in shaping citizens. The state will not interfere with the economy, but will be effective in areas such as daily life, education, and religion. The main claim of neoliberal policies, which became effective after 1980, is that the market society to be established by limiting all kinds of state intervention against the market and privatizing public assets will both be an ideal economic order and guarantee freedom. The crisis experienced in practice by neoliberalism's understanding of a self-regulating market society made it necessary in the post-1990 period to regulate the global economy through a series of global or regional agreements, to transform the state within the framework of the market logic, and to restructure the state in a way that regulates phenomena such as social security, urban regeneration and immigration (Munck, 2005: 63). What is behind the crisis of neoliberalism today is that the ideals that

it put forward at the beginning have not been realized. The market-oriented transformation of the state has not allowed the expansion of freedom, as opposed to neoliberals' claim, increased the fragility of citizens who have reached social welfare through the protectionist policies of the welfare state, brought along the accumulation of the resources in the hands of a limited elite, and led to the rise of inequality, insecurity, poverty and polarization on a global scale.

Economic injustice, which emerged in the distribution of resources as a result of neoliberal policies, has led to the emergence of populist policies on a global scale with a widespread support. Populist movements, parties or leaders, albeit in different forms and names, have put forward a policy that would broaden their social base against the problems caused by neoliberal policies, claiming to defend the interests of the people against economic elites. It is possible to say that two populist responses have emerged against the crisis of neoliberalism. The first is the rise of left-wing populist movements, which have gained broad popular support against the devastation of neoliberal policies and envision the fair and equal sharing of resources. Second, in the rise of far-right populist politics in the European context, the rise to power or popular support of the national discourse, which is based on the idea that the factor that caused poverty is the migrants, refugees and culturally foreigners from different countries, rather than neoliberal economic policies. While populists act with different motives, positioning themselves against the destruction caused by neoliberalism, they claim that power should be taken from a limited minority and maintained by politicians who will ensure the true representation of the people. In this respect, populism should be seen as a response to the governance crisis caused by neoliberalism in the economic and social sphere. Especially when looking at the right-wing populist movements, although they have achieved a wide public support against the economic inequality caused by neoliberalism, these movements have not put forward a radical critique of neoliberal policies. Right-wing populists see economic inequalities as the accumulation of resources in the hands of a limited elite other than the people, rather than a problem arising from the economic philosophy of neoliberalism. The solution is formulated as taking these resources from the elite and giving them to the real people. In countries where populist leaders, movements or parties remain in opposition, populists put forward a politics of distribution that will take the resources accumulated in the hands of a limited economic elite from them and distribute these resources to the people. On the other hand, in countries where they come to power, they follow a policy that will eliminate the inequalities caused by neoliberal policies through patronage, favoritism and bribery for their own supporters (Müller, 2019: 16). Instead of seeing neoliberalism and the inequalities it causes as a problem, they prefer to follow a policy that

centers on discourses that cause social exclusion against different social groups and in this way expand their social base. For this reason, although populists aim to come to power by seeing the sources of inequality, insecurity, and unequal distribution of resources caused by neoliberalism as a problem caused by economic elites, when they come to power, they keep out the groups and people who they think do not constitute the people, and they create an unequal and unfair political order again. Therefore, although the social conditions caused by neoliberalism constitute one of the driving forces behind the rise of populists, populists contribute to the deepening of the social crisis by reproducing the conditions caused by neoliberalism in order to protect their power.

4. Populism as the Crisis of Globalization

Globalization is a phenomenon that involves the interdependence of individuals, nations and groups, showing that we gradually “live in one world”, as a result of the expansion of economic, political and cultural fields on a global scale (Giddens, 2009: 126). The concept of globalization has been seen as an inevitable process that has shaped the world for the last thirty years by many actors from daily life to business world, from political powers to media. Radical globalizationist approaches, which defend the claim that globalization is an inevitable process, argue that we live in a global world order, that nation-states can no longer be seen as sovereign units, that the global circulation of labor, goods and capital has entered an irreversible path, at the same time, from the global climate crisis to global criminal networks and terrorism, that all processes take place in a global space, and they address the increase of multinational companies, the integration of financial markets and the spread of popular culture as concrete indicators of the establishment of a global society (Held & McGrew, 2008: 13). The main reason for the tension experienced on a global scale is that the claims that a single functioning political, economic and cultural order has been established, which has become concrete in the claims of radical globalizationists, have entered into a crisis. Of course, although globalization seems to point to a smooth world from the beginning, it leads to a series of tensions that emerge in different periods. Tensions between global networks and local nationalisms, national interest and the global market, territorialism and deterritorialization, local culture and universal culture have formed the basis of global tensions from the very beginning (Brown, 2010: 8). As radical globalization advocates claim that global competition, instead of globalization being a phenomenon that operates equally all over the world, has caused the fragmentation of local economic networks, injustice in the distribution of income among social groups, and the concentration of resources in the hands of a limited group (Rodrik, 2020). Along with the current tensions of globalization, a series of developments

that have emerged in recent years have once again brought to the agenda that a functioning global order will only be a myth. The crisis experienced by the European Union after Brexit, which claims to create a model for the global order, building of the wall at the Mexican border to prevent illegal immigrants, and the states recalling their national capital to the country, has caused the claims of the globalization discourse to go into a crisis.

Globalization is not only in a political and economic crisis, but also in a cultural crisis. The claim that globalization is a process of social and cultural hybridization is also questioned. It has been claimed by many theorists that with globalization, a common ground would be created in people's daily life, values, norms and lifestyles, and a global culture would emerge (Berger, 2002: 2). It was assumed that globalization would trigger a cultural cosmopolitanism, a hybridization or a unidirectional cultural world would be created in which common values in terms of attitudes, behaviors and beliefs would be created through global elites or popular culture. Everyone, from business world to politicians, from youth to ordinary people, has been seen as the bearers of these cultural codes as entertainers of global culture. With the globalization process, the increase in transportation facilities that facilitate the movement of people from one place to another, changes in communication technologies, the global spread of popular culture, ethnic and racial encounters created by migration processes have led to the emergence of different forms of conflict rather than integration. The increasing trend in the flow of people on a global scale has made it possible to meet different cultural identities, and legal and illegal immigration has caused the emergence of a multinational composition by transforming the structure of nation-states based on a single nation. The big cities of the world have now turned into places where individuals from everywhere and all classes flow into the same place and have to live together. The intensity of cultural encounters caused by globalization has not only enabled a hybridization based on difference but also led to a process in which differences exclude each other. For example, considering the changes in the global labor market, a significant change has occurred in the global flow of migration and immigrant labor. The need for legal and illegal immigrant labor in the global labor market has often led to the emergence of racial division and cultural conflicts (Hardt & Negri, 2009: 135). Globalization is not just the scene of conflicts caused by encounters in space. Culturally, the process of building common norms and values has resulted in the emergence of the process of re-appropriating and attributing meaning to “the world that has slipped out of our hands” (Giddens, 2000: 37). Contrary to what was assumed, the cultural impact of globalization has made it possible to invoke and resurrect traditional or historical cultural values rather than the creation of hybrid or common cultural values. The reason why

populists see original cultural values as a constructive element for the uniqueness of the people is precisely because of the ease of settling the slipping world back into place, and using identities of the past as an original beginning.

The crisis of the idea that globalization would create a single economic, political and cultural society is one of the important driving forces behind the rise of populist movements. The claims that globalization destroys the local, weakens the national identity, and disrupts the working life by transforming it into a multi-ethnic structure, that the national culture is eroded, and that traditional lifestyles have been transformed have a central place in forming the basic discourse of right-wing populist politics. It is possible to say that hate speech against minorities and foreigners was effective in the strengthening and coming to power of right-wing populist movements, especially in Europe (Fassin, 2018: 8). Holding these groups responsible for a series of changes / negativities caused by globalization lies behind the fact that anti-immigration has become the central discourse of right-wing populist politics. Although the discourses of populist movements are different, they gain the support of social groups that are dissatisfied with the economic, political and social inequalities created by globalization and the loss of their cultural identity (Bajo-Rubio & Yan, 2019: 230). The radical changes created by globalization on individuals' lives also have an important effect on the rise of populist movements and their gaining a social base. With globalization, the decline of the influence of the traditions and customs that shape human life, the trivialization of the founding constants that determine identity, the religion losing its previous determining power in shaping daily life, the change in the patriarchal structure of working life, and the increasing reflexivity of people on their own lives also play an important role in the rise of right-wing populist movements. Since especially right-wing populist movements see the changes caused by globalization as a kind of deterioration, they aim to use conservative and nationalist discourses about the need to protect the past by glorifying it to create a mass base.

Populist movements have sought to strengthen their social base by relying on the claims that globalization erodes local cultural values, leads to uniformity of cultural experience, destroys local elements that establish identity, and makes culture marketable under market conditions. Of course, rather than seeing populist movements as a political attitude that led to the emergence of cultural exclusion, they should be seen as movements that use these existing phenomena in society for their own political ends. Pointing to the impossibility of a cosmopolitan world with discourses such as nationalism and indigenism against the foreign, differences and practices of globalization (Ingram, 2017: 644), a number

of populist parties such as the National Front in France, the Independence Party in England and the American Tea Party mobilizes the opposition formed in the society for their own political discourses. In this respect, populism, as a discriminatory identity politics, challenges the pluralism of liberal democracy, and acts from a single, homogeneous and genuine idea of the people rather than an understanding that is equal, fair and recognizing differences (Müller, 2019: 16). The populists' imagination of pure people is therefore central to the creation of mass mobilization that allows groups considered to be outside the people to be excluded and marginalized. Since populism tends to base the establishment of the people as a pure subject often on an authentic and essentialist conception, the populist subject is positioned against the other through a certain essential identity. This other is formulated as the elite, or foreigners, who often spoil the pure nature of the people (Ingram, 2017: 647). Populism is the opposite of cosmopolitanism precisely because of its essentialist qualities. Therefore, as opposed to the cosmopolitan world imagination of globalization, it acts on essentialist foundations such as nationalism and indigenism. In this respect, while populism should be seen as a politics style that has risen as a result of the crisis that globalization has entered, it should also be seen as a politics style that causes the crisis of the idea of a globalized functioning world to deepen due to its anti-cosmopolitan attitude.

5. Conclusion

The crisis of liberal democracy, the crisis of neoliberal policies and the crisis of globalization have been effective in bringing populism back to the agenda of politics in recent years. The rise of populist leaders, movements and parties on a global scale should be seen as an exigency rather than a coincidence. What does it mean to see the rise of populist politics as a kind of exigency? Populists come to power with different ideologies, different identities and discourses as seen in the experiences of different countries, or they gain wide public support. Behind the rise of populism, a kind of criticism of the political elite in the context of the limits of liberal democracy, a criticism of the economic elite in the context of the limits of the neoliberal economy, and the criticism of immigrants and foreigners in the context of the crisis of globalization come to the fore with a different tone or originality. In this respect, the rise of populist movements should be seen as a means of managing the crisis which the idea of a world order functioning with its economic, political and cultural dimensions has entered into, and as a means of controlling the crises in a way that will prevent radicalization of social groups created by the crises and enable them to be mobilized again for the continuity of the order. As Mudde and Kaltwasser (2019: 57) point out, mobilization is “a wide variety of individuals struggling to raise

awareness of a particular problem and this leading them to act collectively to support their cause". It is possible to say that populist politics has organized a mass mobilization with different forms of mobilization in the form of leader, party and movement, which is claimed to represent the people, as can be seen in different countries experiences. As can be seen in many cases, populism emerges in the form of a social movement organized in the form of a grassroots movement or mobilizing social demands by taking the form of a party as a combination of leader and grassroots movement, as well as a series of discourses involving the ultimate representation or liberation of the people in the leader's personal charisma (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2019: 58). The main reason why populist politics follow different routes is that the economic, political and cultural routes of the countries are different from each other. In other words, the fact that the dimensions of the economic, political and cultural crisis have emerged in different countries in different forms and intensities leads to the emergence of different types of mobilization. Another reason why the mobilization style is different is that the political cultures of the countries where populist politics emerge show different characteristics. Although the emergence of populist politics has different characteristics, populism is not a critique of the overall functioning of the system or a style of politics that aims to radically abolish the system; on the contrary, it should be seen as a style of politics that aims to create an order in a crisis by reproducing the crisis caused by the functioning global order myth and creating a wide base for the social radicalization tendencies caused by the system. This is because although crises have provided a starting point for the mobilization building of populists, sometimes the constant state of crisis enables the social ground required for populists empowerment. For this reason, populism creates the possibilities to keep this mobilization alive by pointing to a moment of constant crisis. Populism should be viewed not as a deviation or an irrational choice of the disconnected masses, but as a style of politics with the goal of achieving power relying on the ruling crisis caused by the order or the discourse of an existence of a crisis. In this respect, populism is neither a danger to democracy in the absolute sense, nor a desire to radically change the system, if we do not consider the rights of minorities and immigrants and freedom of expression as the indispensable prerequisites of democracies. On the contrary, it is a new form of government and politics in the form of criticism of the promises of liberal democracy to achieve popular sovereignty, economic policies that have not made possible the fair and equal distribution of economic resources, and the unfulfilled promises of discourses that claim that a global world and a cosmopolitan culture are possible. The power of populist movements, as can be seen in many cases, is in their ability to make grassroots demands a part of public debate in countries where they are on

the rise, rather than coming to power or winning the votes of the vast majority (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2019: 120-121). Therefore, populists have pursued an effective policy in carrying the discourses of the masses whose demands did not come to power to the center, and caused the crisis of the system to deepen through the demands of the masses. It would exactly be more correct to read the rise of populism as a phenomenon with a series of historical-social causes, rather than seeing the rise of populism as an accidental response to the economic, political and cultural crises we are in. In this respect, although populism claims to respond to the internal crises of the system or, to put it another way, to the crisis in the “government apparatus”, it also has a dimension that reproduces and deepens the crises it tries to solve.

References

- Arditi, B. (2007). *Politics on the edges of liberalism: Difference, populism, revolution, agitation*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Bajo-Rubio, O., & Yan, H.D. (2019). Globalization and populism. In F.L.T. Yu, & D.S. Kwan (Eds.), *Contemporary issues in international political economy* (pp. 229-252). Singapore: Springer Singapore.
- Berger, P.L. (2002). The cultural dynamics of globalization. In P.L. Berger, & S.P. Huntington (Eds.), *Many globalizations: Cultural diversity in the contemporary world* (pp. 1-16). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Berktaş, F. (2008). Liberalizm. In H. Birsen Örs (Ed.), *19. yüzyıldan 20. yüzyıla modern siyasal ideolojiler* (pp. 47-114). İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.
- Brown, W. (2010). *Walled states, waning sovereignty*. New York: Zone Books.
- Duménil, G., & Lévy, D. (2009). *Kapitalizmin marksist iktisadı*. (Translated by S. Pelek). İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
- Fassin, E. (2018). *Popülizm: Büyük hınç* (Translated by G. Kırnalı and İ. Kocael). Ankara: Heretik Yayınları.
- Giddens, A. (2000). *Runaway world: How globalization is reshaping our lives*. New York: Routledge.
- Giddens, A. (2009). *Sociology*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Hardt, M., & Negri, A. (2009). *Commonwealth*. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Held, D., & McGrew, A. (2008). Büyük küreselleşme tartışması (Translated by A.S. Mercan and E. Sarıot). In D. Held, & A. McGrew (Eds.), *Küresel dönüşümler: Büyük küreselleşme tartışması* (pp. 7-69). Ankara: Phoenix Yayınevi.
- Ingram, J. (2017). Populism and cosmopolitanism. In C.R. Kaltwasser, P. Taggart, P.O. Espejo, & P. Ostiguy (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of populism* (pp. 644–660). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Köker, L. (2008). *Demokrasi, eleştiri ve Türkiye*. Ankara: Dipnot Yayınları.
- Moffitt, B. (2020). *Popülizmin küresel yükselişi: Performans, siyasi üslup ve temsil*. (Translated by O. Yıldız). İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

- Mudde, C., & Kaltwasser, C. R. (2019). *Popülizm: Kısa bir giriş*. (Translated by S. Erdem Türközü). Ankara: Nika Yayınevi.
- Munck, R. (2005). Neoliberalism and Politics, and the Politics of Neoliberalism. In A. Saad-Filho, & D. Johnston (Eds.), *Neoliberalism: A critical reader* (pp. 60-70). London: Pluto Press.
- Müller, J.W. (2019). *Popülizm nedir?* (Translated by O. Yıldız). İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
- Rodrik, D. (2020). *Why does globalization fuel populism? Economics, culture, and the rise of right-wing populism*. Retrieved from https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w27526/w27526.pdf
- Rummens, S. (2017). Populism as a threat to liberal democracy. In C.R. Kaltwasser, P. Taggart, P.O. Espejo, & P. Ostiguy (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of populism* (pp. 544–570). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Schmitt, C. (1988). *The crisis of parliamentary democracy*. (Translated by E. Kennedy). Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Taggart, P. (2002). Populism and the pathology of representative politics. In M. Yves, & S. Yves (Eds.), *Democracies and the populist challenge* (pp. 62-80). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Urbinati, N. (2013). The populist phenomenon. *Raisons Politiques*, 51(3), 137-154.